![]() ![]() Extent of Allied Air Coverage (Author Graphic) In the Caribbean, planes flew convoy routes from Coco Solo, Panama to Trinidad and on to San Juan, Puerto Rico. In Natal, Brazil, the Navy took over facilities that Pan Am had been developing in 1940, but the facilities did not officially become active until 1943. For example, the Danish government in exile gave the United States permission to operate aircraft out of Narsarsuaq, Greenland in April 1941 VP-6 aircraft did not operate from there until October 1943. Unfortunately, gaining permission to operate an airfield did not mean planes could start flying right away. worked with host nations to build and develop airfields. In order to close gaps, the Navy went to work opening air bases around the Atlantic rim to expand air coverage. The Navy had to continue to close coverage gaps. However, the German U-boats continued their depredations farther to sea into an area where aircraft could not reach. Air coverage decreased the number of attacks in the western approaches to the English Channel. In August 1942, aircraft were limited to proximity from the U.S., Canada, Iceland, Northern Ireland, Gibraltar, and the African coast. The Allies closed air coverage gaps in three ways: they expanded the number of air stations, developed longer-range aircraft, and integrated the escort carrier (CVE). The challenge for the Allies was to extend air coverage to cover the entire convoy route. Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was the result of the Allies’ ability to eliminate gaps in air coverage with long range air and carrier-based convoy escorts. The Battle of the Atlantic tested the Allies’ ability to defend trans-Atlantic convoys at points throughout the European Theater of Operations, from Archangel to Cape Town and the Panama Canal to the Suez Canal convoys had to be protected from submarines. Navy’s historical use of air power and technology to overcome submarine advantages and then explore future improvements to close the gaps using unmanned aircraft. To defend the CVN or any high value vessels from submarines, we may find the answer to be similar to what it was in World War II and the Cold War. center of gravity for naval combat remains the CVN. This is not the first time that we have dealt with an increasingly dangerous submarine threat. These missiles threaten our Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) because the CSG lacks an organic capability to detect and engage these submarines outside of the submarines’ WEZ. The Russian and Chinese navies have invested heavily in building quiet submarines capable of firing Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) in excess of 200 nm. ![]() Today, the challenge to protect the carrier remains, and a dangerous new gap needs to be closed. The challenge was to protect the carrier both for convoy protection and force projection. During the Cold War Era, the center of gravity was the power projection capability of the carrier. In order to convoy ships across the Atlantic, the Allies had to close the gaps in air coverage. The Allied struggle was to reduce air coverage gaps in the Atlantic to effectively protect convoys. In the Second World War, the European naval war’s center of gravity was the trans-Atlantic convoys that supplied the Allies’ war effort. It enables them to conduct wide-area searches and engage submarines before a submarine can attack.Īirpower is vital to protecting the center of gravity. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is about putting sensors and weapons in place to detect and destroy submarines. The types of sensors have changed based on technological improvements and types of submarines, but the main principle is minimizing the sensor coverage gaps and engaging the submarine before it is within its weapons engagement zone (WEZ). Speed, endurance, and flexibility make aircraft excellent ASW platforms. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |